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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)1 ponders the,
structure of the modem stock markets,2 it confronts an industry that has
1. For a description of the SEC and its functions, see infra notes 72-74 and accompany-
ing text.
2. In July 1992, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation published a concept release
that announced it would undertake a comprehensive study of the U.S. equity markets entitled
"Market 2000." U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, 51
SEC Docket (CCH) 1524 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter Market 2000 Release]. The release "(i)
outlines the general purpose, scope and objectives of the Division's study; (ii) poses questions
on critical equity market structure issues; and (iii) requests information from market partici-
pants and observers regarding certain issues the Division believes relevant to its study." Id. at
1525.
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undergone substantial change in the past quarter century. For example,
today, brokers in the United States can execute stock trades electroni-
cally from their desktops, with a guarantee that they will receive the best
quoted price available, only seconds after their customers have made the
decision to buy or sell.3 Further, in order to compete internationally for
a share of the volume of U.S. stocks traded daily on foreign stock ex-
changes, the primary exchanges4 have lengthened the hours during
which investors may execute trades.' The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) has even contemplated developing trading systems that would
accommodate stock trading twenty-four hours a day.'
Even as U.S. stock markets modernize, however, they encourage
many antiquated practices of colonial stock trading.' This should not be
surprising. The NYSE, the most influential of the U.S. stock markets,
seeks to preserve the status quo, which is responsible for the NYSE's
near monopoly in the auction trading' of securities.9 The American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the regional exchanges, fearful of losing
3. See Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine whether to Approve or Disapprove
Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 19,858, 28 SEC Docket (CCH) 16, 17-18
(June 9, 1983); 5 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2560-62 (3d ed.
1989) (discussing derivative pricing systems used by Midwest Stock Exchange, Pacific Stock
Exchange and Philadelphia Stock Exchange).
4. There are currently seven stock exchanges in the United States. See Market 2000
Release, supra note 2, at 1529 n.14. Two of them, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), are known as primary exchanges. Id. The other five
are regional exchanges: the Boston Stock Exchange, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, the Mid-
west Stock Exchange (MSE) in Chicago, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the Pacific
Stock Exchange with branches in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Id.
5. See Order Granting Temporary Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to thq
New York Stock Exchange's Off-Hours Trading Facility, Exchange Act Release No. 29,237,
48 SEC Docket (CCH) 1512 (May 24, 1991) (approving NYSE's Off-Hours Trading System);
Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the American Stock Exchange's
After-Hours Trading Facility, Exchange Act Release No. 29,515, 49 SEC Docket (CCH) 742
(Aug. 2, 1991) (temporarily approving AMEX's after-hours trading facility).
6. Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the World Securi-
ties Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 32 SEC Docket (CCH) 1241, 1244 (Apr. 18,
1985); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK: GLOBAL SE-
CURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 18 (1990) (discussing NYSE's "inten-
tion to study the feasibility of off-board 24-hour trading systems").
7. See infra part II.
8. For a discussion of the auction trading of securities, see infra note 129.
9. See 1990 SEC ANN. REP. 141 (1991). "The volume of trading in stocks on all regis-
tered exchanges totaled 54.2 billion shares... with 81% of the total accounted for by trading
on the NYSE." Id. However, not all stocks are traded on registered exchanges. The Over-
the-Counter (OTC) market accounted for 33.5 billion shares of stocks traded in the United
States in 1989. Id. at 144. Thus, although the NYSE nearly monopolizes trading in the ex-
change markets, it accounts for just over one-half of the shares traded in all U.S. stock mar-
kets. Id. at 141, 144.
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order flow,1" simply mimic the NYSE's practices. These practices, re-
tained out of self-interest, do not necessarily promote the best interests of
the investing public or the overall welfare of the stock markets
themselves.
In particular, the stock markets continue to trade stocks and quote
stock prices in fractions, I1 usually multiples of $1/8.12 To most individual
10. In this Comment, the term "order flow" denotes the volume of trading that occurs on
a particular exchange floor, at a particular specialist's post, or in which a particular market
maker participates. For a discussion of the two types of order flow, see infra note 27. For a
definition of a specialist, see infra note 124. For a definition of a market maker, see infra note
164.
11. The NYSE insists that its members price stocks in fractions. The NYSE Guide states
that:
Bids or offers in stocks above one dollar per share shall not be made at a less varia-
tion than 1/s of one dollar per share; in stocks below one dollar but above '/ of one
dollar per share, at a less variation than '/16 of one dollar per share; in stocks below
'2 of one dollar per share, at a less variation than 1/32 of one dollar per share...
provided that the Exchange may fix variations of less than the above for bids and
offers in specific [stocks].
2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2062 (Dec. 1991) (rule 62).
The AMEX similarly requires its members to price stocks fractionally:
The minimum fractional change for dealings in [stocks] shall be as follows: [Stocks]
selling under $1.00 and above 1/4 of $1.00, VA6 of $1.00 per share; under 1/4 of $1.00,
1/32 of $1.00 per share; at $1.00 and over, 1/s of $1.00 per share .... However,
different minimum fractional changes for dealings in [stocks] may be fixed by the
Exchange.
2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) $ 9277 (Sept. 6, 1962) (rule 127). The SEC recently approved
an AMEX rule change that raised the minimum price below which stocks can be traded in
intervals of S/16 to five dollars. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amend-
ments to Rule 127-Minimum Fractional Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 31,118, 52 SEC
Docket (CCH) 1219 (Aug. 28, 1992).
The regional exchanges generally adopt the pricing structure of the primary exchanges for
stocks listed on the primary exchanges, but create unique rules for the fractional pricing of
stocks listed only on the regional exchanges. For example, the Pacific Stock Exchange requires
that:
Unless specifically ruled otherwise the trading differentials on stocks shall be as fol-
lows: (1) On stocks other than those traded on the [NYSE] or [AMEX]:
Selling Price Trading Differential
Below '/2 of $1 ......................... /32
'A of $1 but under $5 ................... 1/16
$5 and above ........................... 'Is
(2) On stocks also traded on the [NYSE] or [AMEX] the trading differentials shall
be the same as those prescribed by such Exchange.
Pac. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 3937 (Aug. 1990) (rule 5.3(b)).
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which regulates the OTC market
under SEC supervision, requires fractional stock pricing as well. Lawrence Harris, Stock Price
Clustering and Discreteness, 4 REv. FIN. STUD. 389, 390 n.2 (1991) ("The [NASD] permits
trades on sixty-fourths for all stocks. Quotes in the NASDAQ system, however, must be a
multiple of $'/s if the bid is above $10 and $1/64 if the bid is under $10.").
12. Although the rules of the various exchanges permit low-priced stocks to be quoted in
fractions smaller than $1/8, see supra note 11, the almost exclusive price for a share of stock
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investors, fractional stock pricing is a cumbersome anachronism that un-
necessarily complicates trading in U.S. stock markets. 13 Perhaps more
importantly, to some observers of U.S. stock market structure, fractional
stock pricing threatens the competitive posture and health of the U.S.
securities industry in an increasingly global securities market.
For example, fractions artificially inflate the spreads between stock
prices."4 Consequently, various market participants generate higher
profits at the expense of the investing public." Moreover, fractions re-
strict the ability of these same market participants to compete with one
another directly. Thus, they must compete only indirectly through the
practice of payment for order flow so that broker-dealers, not their cus-
tomers, benefit from the competition. 6 Finally, fractions handicap the
ability of domestic stock markets to effectively compete with foreign
stock markets for international order flow."
Many of these same observers have suggested, as a remedy to these
structural defects, that U.S. stock markets replace the fractions with
decimals." Decimals would create incentive to compete directly for
traded in U.S. stock markets is a multiple of $1/s; thus, a $1/8 interval in the price of a stock is
known as a "point" or "tick." Craig Torres & Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Weighs Switch to Decf-
mal Stock Quotes, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1991, at Cl. For example, of the 2315 closing stock
prices quoted for NYSE-listed stocks on August 5, 1992 (a randomly selected date), 2296, or
more than 99%, were quoted in intervals of $1/8. See L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at D6-8. The
remaining stocks, totalling less than one percent of those listed were quoted in intervals of $1/16
(eight stocks), $1/32 (eight stocks) and $1/64 (three stocks). See id.
13. See, e.g., Herb Greenberg, Business Insider, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1991, at BI
(" 'These antique stock traders should get out of their rut and make it more understandable for
Mr. and Ms. average.'" (quoting letter from reader)); Beatson Wallace, Old Companies Can be
Tracked Down, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1980, at CI (" 'I can't handle fractions without
pencil and paper and think it would be easier in decimals for most people.'" (quoting letter
from reader)).
Some commentators have suggested that the American public would reject a conversion
to decimals for many of the same reasons that the American public rejected a conversion to the
metric system during the 1970s. See, eg., Chris Wloszczyna, Stock-Pricing Idea Settles Frac-
tional Differences, USA TODAY, June 13, 1991, at B3. That conclusion does not necessarily
follow. The metric system introduced new basic units of measurement with which the Ameri-
can public was not familiar. Conversely, the American public uses decimals everyday. Indeed,
American consumers pay for virtually everything they buy in dollars and cents.
14. See infra part IV.A.1 for a discussion of the spreads between stock prices and the effect
of fractional stock pricing on spreads.
15. See infra notes 148-55, 176-77.
16. See infra notes 179-201 for a discussion of payment for order flow.
17. See infra notes 210-26.
18. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 567 (7th ed. 1992);
Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 134 (1984);
Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter
Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17, 98 n.480 (1986); John C. Coffee Jr., Brokers and Bribery,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 1990, at 5, 31 [hereinafter Coffee, Brokers and Bribery]; John C. Coffee Jr.,
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stock trade order flow, thereby narrowing spreads19 and discouraging the
practice of payment for order flow.2' In each instance, the ultimate bene-
ficiary would be the investing public. Additionally, decimals would en-
able domestic stock markets to compete with foreign stock markets for
international order flow on a more level playing field.21
Despite the validity of these arguments, however, the NYSE and the
AMEX have resisted attempts to convert to decimals. After all, in an
industry that trades securities worth nearly $2.5 trillion annually,22 there
is little incentive to eliminate fractional stock pricing which has, in part,
made artificially inflated profits possible.23 Moreover, the SEC has been
unwilling to mandate the conversion.24 Indeed, the SEC has never sys-
tematically investigated or solicited public comment on the defects asso-
ciated with fractional stock pricing or the feasibility (both practically and
as a matter of administrative authority) of forcing the primary exchanges
to convert to decimals.25
Therefore, as a prelude to an ultimate recommendation that the
SEC conduct a thorough inquiry into such a conversion as part of ifs
impending Market 2000 study of the structure of the U.S. stock mar-
kets,26 part II of this Comment presents the historical development of
fractional stock pricing. It concludes that fractional stock pricing is
merely the end product of the evolution of colonial New York currency
and, therefore, not necessarily the most beneficial or efficient means of
pricing stocks. Part III examines the SEC's administrative authority to
create a rule that forces U.S. stock markets to adopt decimal stock pric-
ing. The remainder of this Comment addresses the advisability of adopt-
ing a decimal stock pricing rule. Accordingly, part IV discusses the most
significant benefits to be gained: improved competition for domestic and
international order flow.2" This Comment then examines the institu-
Mysteries of the National Market System, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1992, at 5, 7 [hereinafter Coffee,
National Market System].
19. See infra part IV.A.1.
20. See infra part IV.A.2.
21. See infra part IV.B.
22. See 1990 SEC ANN. RlP., supra note 9, at 144 (citing statistics indicating that market
value of securities traded on exchanges in 1989 was $1.8 trillion and that market value of
securities traded on NASDAQ System was $431.4 billion).
23. See infra part V.A.
24. See infra part VI.
25. See infra part VI for a discussion of the SEC's previous efforts to investigate a potential
conversion to decimal stock pricing.
26. For a brief description of the Market 2000 study, see supra note 2.
27. In this Comment, the phrase "competition for domestic order flow" includes all com-
petition among domestic stock markets for all stock trades, regardless of whether the stocks are
of foreign or domestic issue. Conversely, the phrase "competition for international order flow"
April 1993]
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tional response to these arguments and addresses the various arguments
used to defend fractional stock pricing.2
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FRACTIONAL STOCK PRICING
A. Introduction
In 1792, twenty-four New York stockbrokers created the Button-
wood Agreement to form the first organized stock market in New
York.2 9 Accounting records suggest that they traded stocks priced in
shillings and pence.30 Those accounting records, however, masked ac-
tual trading in fractions of the Spanish dollar.3 They traded in fractions
not because they had determined that fractions were more advantageous
to them or to those who bought their stocks, but because fractions of the
Spanish dollar had become the standard currency of New York.
32
Although Philadelphia was the site of the first organized U.S. stock
market,33 the New York market soon evolved into the New York Stock
and Exchange Board,34 and eventually into the present-day New York
Stock Exchange.35 In doing so, the influence of the New York market
includes all competition between domestic markets and foreign markets for all stock trades,
regardless of whether the stocks are of foreign or domestic issue.
28. See infra part V.
29. These brokers had traded stocks informally beneath a buttonwood tree in front of 68
Wall Street; hence, their first agreement was known as the Buttonwood Agreement. SERENO
S. PRATr, THE WORK OF WALL STREET 4-5 (1921); ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD 20
(1968); Robert Steiner, 200 Years Later, Small Investors Find Clout at America's Premier Ex-
change, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at Cl. The brokers who signed the Buttonwood Agree-
ment agreed to "'give ... preference to each other in [their] Negotiations.'" FRANCIS L.
EAMES, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (1968) (quoting Buttonwood Agreement).
These brokers were the predecessors of the present-day NYSE. See infra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the early history of the New York stock market, see
EAMES, supra, at 13-17; JEFFREY B. LITTLE & LUCIEN RHODES, UNDERSTANDING WALL
STREET 18-22 (3d ed. 1991); PRATT, supra, at 4-8; SOBEL, supra, at 14-27; ROBERT I. WAR-
SHOW, THE STORY OF WALL STREET 31-38 (1929); and E.C. Stedman & A.N. Easton, History
of the New York Stock Exchange, in THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 15, 30-43 (Edmund
C. Stedman ed., 1957).
30. See EAMES, supra note 29, at 15 (showing stock quotation list from May 26, 1792).
31. See LESLIE V. BROCK, THE CURRENCY OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES 4 (1975); ROB-
ERT M. SHARP, THE LORE AND LEGENDS OF WALL STREET 34 (1989).
32. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
33. PRATT, supra note 29, at 9; WARSHOW, supra note 29, at 40.
34. EAMES, supra note 29, at 18; PRATT, supra note 29, at 7-8. In 1817 the brokers who
had been trading under the 1792 Buttonwood Agreement formed the New York Stock and
Exchange Board and adopted a constitution, in which they agreed not to disclose to the public
the names of buyers and sellers of stocks. EAMES, supra note 29, at 18; PRAT, supra note 29,
at 7-8.
35. LITTLE & RHODES, supra note 29, at 20.
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eclipsed that of the Philadelphia market,3 6 and stock markets nationwide
adopted the characteristics of the New York market.37 Thus, all U.S.
stock markets now price stocks in fractions, generally in multiples of
$1/8.38
B. Colonial New York Currency
The early colonists had very little currency 39 and, consequently, op-
erated in a barter economy.4' However, as the colonies developed and
the colonists' need for a stable currency increased, they began to use
commodities as money41 because no single coin could sustain the colo-
nists' currency needs. 2 In particular, New York, due to its lack of coin-
age, was possessed of "a vicious currency system which not only worked
iniquity in its own time but bequeathed to a later generation the effects of
its debasement. 43
One commodity, wampumpeague (wampum),' had served as a sta-
ble form of currency among Indian communities long before the colo-
nists arrived.4 Wampum was a string of beads made of seashells.
4 6
36. PRATT, supra note 29, at 9; WARSHOW, supra note 29, at 40-41.
37. See PRATT, supra note 29, at 7 ("The history of Wall Street from [the early 1800s]
becomes practically the history of the agricultural, industrial, and commercial development of
the United States."); SOBEL, supra note 29, at 26 ("New York became 'the tip of the tongue
that laps up the cream of the commerce of a continent."' (quoting LEONARD L. LEVINSON,
WALL STREET: A PICTORIAL HISTORY 13 (1968) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes))).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
39. NEIL CAROTHERS, FRACTIONAL MONEY 21 (1930); SHARP, supra note 31, at 31.
40. SHARP, supra note 31, at 31; WILLIAM G. SUMNER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CUR-
RENCY 5 (New York, Henry Holt and Co. 1874).
41. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 20; SHARP, supra note 31, at 31. The colonists used the
staple and, therefore, stable products of the colonial economy: corn, cattle, wool, lumber,
tobacco, beaver skins, rice, furs, pitch, nails and bullets. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 20;
SHARP, supra note 31, at 31.
42. Although the colonies circulated an impressive array of foreign-minted coins, they
lacked a single coin that could serve, in large quantities, as the currency foundation for the
developing colonial economy. See BROCK, supra note 31, at 4-5; CAROTHERS, supra note 39,
at 21. "A complicated circulation of currency consisting of guineas, doubloons, pistoles, jo-
hannes pieces, and sequins, all of foreign origin, had served to complicate and confuse the
simplest transactions." WARSHOW, supra note 29, at 39.
43. Stedman & Easton, supra note 29, at 30.
44. Wampumpeague was known variously as wampum, peag(e), peak(e) and roanoke.
CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 20; SHARP, supra note 31, at 31; SUMNER, supra note 40, at 3.
In New Amsterdam (later New York), it was known as seawant. Stedman & Easton, supra
note 29, at 22.
45. SHARP, supra note 31, at 31; SUMNER, supra note 40, at 3.
46. Wampum has been described as follows:
[Wampum] consisted of beads of two kinds, one white, made out of the end of a
periwinkle shell, and the other black, made out of the black part of a clam shell.
These beads were rubbed down and polished as articles of ornament, and arranged in
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"White" wampum was made of white beads and "dark" or "black"
wampum was made of black beads. 7 Because black beads were rarer
than white beads, dark wampum was more valuable.48
The colonists adopted the Indian wampum as their own currency
soon after colonization. 9 When other commodities failed to provide the
colonists with a stable currency, wampum became "legal tender from
Massachusetts to Virginia."50 In most colonies, it remained valuable as a
general medium of circulation throughout the seventeenth century, but
New York used wampum well into the eighteenth century51 because, be-
yond wampum, New York colonists lacked small change currency.
5 2
Early in the seventeenth century, Spanish dollars began pouring into
the colonies 3 and soon became the predominant coin. 4 The colonists
traded wampum, English coinage5 and the Spanish dollar side by side;
however, the value and, therefore, the trading ratios of these three cur-
rencies varied from colony to colony and over time. 6
In New York, by 1700 the trading ratios stabilized at one Spanish
dollar to eight shillings5 7 or eight feet of white wampum.58 Because of
this ratio, and because of the ease with which the Spanish dollar could be
chiseled into pie-shaped subdivisions, the Spanish dollar was broken into
strings or belts .... These beads and belts were used by the Indians themselves as
money, and were real money. They regarded one black bead as worth two white....
... A fathom or belt of wampum consisted of 360 beads.
SUMNER, supra note 40, at 3-4.
47. See Stedman & Easton, supra note 29, at 22.
48. See SHARP, supra note 31, at 33; SUMNER, supra note 40, at 3-4; Stedman & Easton,
supra note 29, at 22.
49. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 20; SHARP, supra note 31, at 33; SUMNER, supra note
40, at 4; Stedman & Easton, supra note 29, at 22.
50. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 20.
51. Id. at 20-21. Wampum was useful to the early colonists because its value was stable
and because production of wampum did not exceed the production of goods and services.
SHARP, supra note 31, at 33.
52. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 27.
53. d at 21.
54. Id
55. There was never a significant amount of English coinage (pounds, shillings and pence)
in circulation in the colonies because the Crown had prohibited its exportation from England
to the colonies. BROCK, supra note 31, at 4. Nevertheless, the colonists kept their accounting
records in pounds, shillings and pence even as they traded with wampum and the Spanish
dollar. See id.
56. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 23.
57. Id.
58. SHARP, supra note 31, at 34. Dark wampum was twice as valuable as white wampum.
Id. at 33; see supra note 48 and accompanying text. Thus, by implication, the Spanish dollar
also traded for four feet of dark wampum.
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as many as eight pieces known as "bits." 9 Hence, the Spanish dollar
was also known as the "piece-of-eight." Each bit, then, was worth one
foot of white wampum. Thus, New York merchants priced their goods
and services in bits, for which their customers could pay in either wam-
pum or eighths of a Spanish dollar, because New York colonists accepted
each equally, and the two currencies traded in a one-to-one ratio.
After the Spanish dollar began circulating widely, wampum, in all
its forms, fell into disuse, even in New York.61 Although it had usefully
stabilized New York currency well into the eighteenth century, it was
obsolete after the rise of the Spanish dollar.62 Among other deficiencies,
wampum was fragile, less mobile than small coinage, and easily counter-
feited by artificial coloring.6" Nevertheless, wampum left its mark on the
Spanish dollar, and subsequently on U.S. stock markets, by causing the
Spanish dollar to be chiseled into eighths.
When organized stock trading began in New York in 1792 pursuant
to the Buttonwood Agreement, stock prices were quoted in bits or
eighths.64 That tradition continues today.6" Although stock quotation
lists dated May 26, 1792 (nine days after the signing of the Buttonwood
Agreement) displayed quotations in shillings and pence,66 such displays
were probably for accounting purposes only.' 7 Actual trading probably
was in the form of Spanish dollars or fractions thereof.68
Congress adopted a plan for a decimal-based U.S. dollar in 1787,
and in 1794 the federal government began minting the new currency.69
By 1794, New York stockbrokers had been operating an organized stock
market for almost two years. Accustomed to quoting stock prices in
fractions of the Spanish dollar, they never adjusted to the new decimal
59. SHARP, supra note 31, at 34.
60. CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 21. The Mexican-minted Spanish dollar, or piece-of-
eight, was also known as the "pillar dollar" for its depiction, on the reverse side, of a "crown
above a shield, flanked by the 'Pillars of Hercules.'" SHARP, supra note 31, at 33.
61. See CAROTHERS, supra note 39, at 20-21.
62. See id. at 20.
63. Id. Because dark wampum traded at a premium over white wampum, the colonists
had an incentive to produce counterfeit dark wampum. They accomplished this by coloring
the white wampum to make it look like the more valuable dark wampum. See id.; SHARP,
supra note 31, at 33; Stedman & Easton, supra note 29, at 22.
64. SHARP, supra note 31, at 34.
65. Id.
66. EAMES, supra note 29, at 15 (showing stock quotation list from May 26, 1792).
67. See BROCK, supra note 31, at 4.
68. See id.; SHARP, supra note 31, at 34.
69. Stedman & Easton, supra note 29, at 42-43. Congress abolished the Spanish dollar in
1853. SHARP, supra note 31, at 34.
April 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
scheme.70 Thus, there was no alffrmative decision to price stocks in frac-
tions and, consequently, no study of the impact of fractional stock pric-
ing on the securities industry. Rather, the practice evolved over time and
failed to adjust to subsequent changes in the structure of U.S. currency.
Stock markets nationwide continue to price stocks in fractions today.7
III. SEC RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
The SEC is an independent, bipartisan, quasi-judicial agency of the
federal government.72 Composed of five members, the SEC and its staff
administer the several statutes that constitute the federal securities laws73
by conducting investigations, processing various filings, adjudicating se-
curities disputes and creating rules to regulate the securities markets.74
The SEC's authority to create rules is plenary. The only limitations on
its authority are: (1) the extent to which any rule is inconsistent with
congressional intent;75 and (2) the SEC's statutory role as a remedial su-
pervisor in an industry that is primarily self-regulated.76 A decimal stock
pricing rule is consistent with congressional intent.77 Moreover, the
SEC's supervisory role does not practically limit the SEC's ability to di-
rectly intervene in the securities markets in a nonremedial capacity by
forcing U.S. stock markets to convert to decimals.
78
A. Statutory Basis
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission in sec-
tion 479 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)80 and en-
dowed it with the general authority to "make such rules and regulations
as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of [the
70. See SHARP, supra note 31, at 34.
71. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
72. SEC, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vii (1971).
73. The seven federal securities statutes, in amended form, are: the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id.
§§ 78a-78kk, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, id. §§ 79 to 79z-6, the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, id. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb, the Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §§ 80a-
I to 80a-52, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21, and the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, id. §§ 78aaa-7811.
74. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1 (1991-92 ed.);
THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.4, at 12 (1985).
75. See infra note 91.
76. See infra part III.B.
77. See infra part III.A.
78. See infra part III.B.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988).
80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
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federal securities statutes]. ' 8 1 Additionally, each of the seven federal se-
curities statutes specifically authorizes the SEC to adopt rules necessary
for the SEC to carry out its statutory functions.82 Because the 1934 Act
targeted only organized securities exchanges,83 the SEC's rulemaking au-
thority did not reach the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market8 4 until 1938,
when Congress amended the 1934 Act.85 Hence, today, the SEC may
regulate the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), as well
as the stock exchanges, all of which are "self-regulatory organizations"
(SROs).
86
More importantly for purposes of this Comment, however, Con-
gress's National Market System legislation of 1975 (1975 amendments),87
which also amended the 1934 Act, authorized the SEC to change the
rules and regulations of the SROs "in any manner in furtherance of the
purposes of the [1934 Act]." 8 When the SEC regulates in this manner,
its rules replace or supplement those of the SROs.89 Consequently, after
the 1975 amendments, the SEC's power to regulate the stock exchanges
and the OTC market is plenary, 90 and all rules consistent with congres-
sional intent are valid.91
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1988).
82. 3 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1936-37 (2d ed. 1961).
83. See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Industry Self-Regulation: Tested by the Crash, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1297, 1298-99 (1988).
84. The OTC market is a nationwide network of broker-dealers that trade all stocks that
are not listed (traded) on the various stock exchanges. LrrrLE & RHODES, supra note 29, at
16; Simon & Colby, supra note 18, at 17 n.2. In addition, OTC broker-dealers trade some
stocks that are listed on the stock exchanges, as well as various other kinds of securities, such
as government and corporate bonds and options. Id The most significant portion of the OTC
market is the NASD, a self-regulatory organization comprised of OTC broker-dealers that
regulates the OTC market under the supervision of the SEC. Id at 18 n.4.
85. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-3, 78q, 78cc, 78ff (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
86. The 1934 Act categorized the stock exchanges and the NASD, among other groups, as
"self-regulatory organizations." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1988). As such, they must regulate
themselves under SEC supervision. Karmel, supra note 83, at 1298-99. For further discussion
of the nature and role of the SEC with respect to SROs, see infra part III.B.
87. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e) (1988).
89. See 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2714; David A. Lipton, The SEC or the
Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When?, 16 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 527, 533 (1983).
90. Lipton, supra note 89, at 533-35.
91. See Mark A. Kahrs, Note, Is the Securities and Exchange Commission Overreaching its
Rulemaking Authority Under Rule 14e-3? [United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1990)], 30 WASHBURN L.J. 300, 321 (1990) ("[Congress] has placed the [SEC] in the role of
safeguarding congressional intent."). One federal court has described the SEC's general
rulemaking authority as follows:
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Therefore, to define the scope of the SEC's rulemaking authority,
and more specifically the SEC's authority to insist that the SROs adopt a
decimal stock pricing rule, one need only define the congressional intent
supporting the 1934 Act and its various amendments. Congress enacted
the original 1934 Act partly in response to the unnecessary and destruc-
tive speculation in securities that contributed to the Great Depression
and the preceding stock market crash.92 Accordingly, one goal of the
original 1934 Act was to protect the investing public from subsequent
market abuses.93
Among other purposes, Congress enacted the 1975 amendments to
facilitate the creation of a National Market System. 94 The legislators
hoped that a National Market System would promote "fair competition
among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between ex-
change markets and markets other than exchange markets." 95 Further,
they hoped that such a system would promote the economically efficient
execution of transactions.96 Accordingly, Congress granted the SEC
broad discretion to oversee the implementation of a National Market
System 97 pursuant to the attainment of these and other enumerated
goals. 98
A conversion from fractional to decimal stock pricing is consistent
with two congressional objectives relating to both the original 1934 Act
and the 1975 amendments: (1) investor protection; and (2) increased
competition between stock markets.99 Consequently, such a conversion
is well within the SEC's general rulemaking authority to alter SRO rules.
[Section] 19(c)... allows the [SEC] on its own initiative to amend the rules of a
[SRO] as it deems necessary or appropriate [1] to insure the fair administration of the
[SRO], [2] to conform its rules to requirements of [the 1934 Act] .... or [3] otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of [the 1934 Act].
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (bracketed enumeration in
original) (emphasis added).
92. See Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 757 (1984).
93. Id. at 755. The seven federal securities statutes create two types of investor protection.
"First, they seek to provide investors with the information needed to trade intelligently in
markets free of fraud and other abuse. Second, they attempt to ensure the effective and respon-
sible operation both of those markets and of the securities industry." Id.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1988).
95. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii).
96. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(i).
97. d § 78k-l(a)(2).
98. These were not the only goals of the National Market System and the 1975 amend-
ments. Rather, Congress also sought to make quotation and transaction data available to mar-
ket participants, to enhance brokers' ability to execute customer orders in the best market, and
to enhance investors' ability to execute transactions without a dealer. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(iii)-
(v) (1988).
99. See infra parts III.B to VII.
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B. Securities Industry Self-Regulation
Although plenary, the SEC's rulemaking authority is not absolute.
As discussed above, the SEC may only adopt rules that are consistent
with congressional intent."co More fundamentally, however, Congress
intended the securities industry to be self-regulated:1°1 Only when the
SROs failed to execute their statutory obligations 02 was the SEC to use
its rulemaking authority to correct those failures.
103
In creating a system of SEC oversight, Congress was particularly
concerned that the SROs, empowered by self-regulation and motivated
by self-interest, would adopt only those rules that tended to promote
their respective competitive positions in the securities marketplace-"°
Alternatively stated, Congress was concerned that the SROs would pre-
fer their own interests to those of the public at large. Hence, even from
the beginning of securities industry self-regulation, Congress intended for
the SEC to regulate the SROs to prevent or remove anti-competitive bar-
riers.105 Under this scheme, the SEC has regulatory authority to amend
SRO rules with a decimal stock pricing rule of its own if the SEC can
show that the SROs' failure to adopt a similar rule burdens competition.
Today, the scheme of self-regulation remains largely intact.
10 6
However, the SEC no longer regulates the SROs in a purely remedial
fashion by reacting only to SRO failures. Rather, the SEC often directly
regulates the SROs by enacting rules even before the SROs have failed to
conform their own rules to the dictates of the securities laws. 10 7 This
100. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 83 (discussing effectiveness of securities industry self-
regulation); Lipton, supra note 89 (discussing evolving role of SEC in self-regulation of securi-
ties industry); Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REv. 475
(1984) (discussing accommodation of antitrust laws to securities industry self-regulation).
102. The SROs are obligated to regulate their own members by adopting rules "designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable princi-
ples of trade,... to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest." 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1988).
103. WILLIAM DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940). Justice Douglas's de-
scription of the SEC's intended role has been frequently cited: "[T]he exchanges take the
leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so
to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used." Id.
104. See Karmel, supra note 83, at 1299; Smythe, supra note 101, at 479.
105. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106. Karmel, supra note 83, at 1299.
107. See Richard W. Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 665-67 (1964); Lip-
ton, supra note 89, at 529.
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expanded role may have been inherent in the statutory scheme since the
SEC's inception in 1934.108 Even if it was not, the SEC has informally
adopted that role for itself by virtue of its consistent, preventive supervi-
sion of the SROs.' 0 9 Congress formally sanctioned that new role by con-
ferring broad rulemaking authority on the SEC in the 1975 amendments
to the 1934 Act. 110
Therefore, whether in its originally intended remedial role, or in its
broader, historically developed preventive role, the SEC does not repudi-
ate the concept of industry self-regulation by adopting rules designed to
promote and remove barriers to competition. Accordingly, neither the
concept of industry self-regulation nor the SEC's general rulemaking au-
thority prevents the SEC from adopting a decimal stock pricing rule if it
can be shown that such a rule would promote competition between stock
markets.
IV. COMPETITION FOR ORDER FLOW
A. Competition for Domestic Order Flow
The SEC has the authority to adopt a rule that would force U.S.
stock markets to quote and trade stocks in decimals if such a rule would
promote competition between domestic stock markets and benefit the in-
vesting public."' Theoretically, stock exchanges and OTC market mak-
ers112 may compete for domestic order flow" 3 based on superior pricing
or better service. 11 4 Currently, however, U.S. stock exchanges compete
on service, but do not systematically compete on price.' OTC market
makers do compete on price, but the fraction format of stock prices re-
stricts the extent to which they can do so effectively. 16
A decimal stock pricing rule would promote competition for domes-
tic order flow in two ways. First, it would promote direct price competi-
tion among OTC market makers and among exchange specialists by
giving them the incentive to publish superior price quotes in a way that
108. See Lipton, supra note 89, at 529.
109. See id. at 529-30.
110. Id at 530.
111. See supra part III.
112. See infra note 164 for the definition of an OTC market maker.
113. See supra note 27.
114. As used in this Comment, "service-based competition" is competition that allows bro-
ker-dealers to execute orders more quickly with fewer transaction costs.
115. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2555-56 (discussing derivative pricing); see infra
text accompanying notes 148-53.
116. For a discussion of the means by which fractions prevent effective price-based competi-
tion between OTC market makers, see infra part IV.A.1.b.
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most benefits their customers.1 17 Second, by creating incentive to com-
pete directly, it would eliminate the nettlesome practice of payment for
order flow,'1 8 which regional exchange specialists and NASD market
makers use as a form of indirect price competition to attract order flow
away from each other and from the primary exchanges." 9
1. Direct price competition: Published stock prices
An investor who seeks to buy or sell shares of a stock usually em-
ploys a broker-dealer1 20 to execute the order. If the order is for an ex-
change-listed stock, the broker-dealer must generally execute the order in
the exchange market.'21 Alternatively, if the order is for an OTC-listed
stock, the broker-dealer must execute the order in the OTC market.
122
Direct competition for that order is fundamentally different depending
on whether the order is for an exchange-listed stock or an OTC-listed
stock. 123 In either case, superior pricing attracts the broker-dealer's or-
der and directly reduces the investor's cost of trading.
a. the exchange markets
The specialist is the focal point of the exchange market. 24 Once the
broker-dealer has located an exchange member firm (member) capable of
117. See infra part IV.A.1.
118. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
119. See infra part IV.A.2.
120. As its name suggests, a "broker-dealer" is both a broker and a dealer. A broker is
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others, but does not include a bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988). A dealer is
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own ac-
count, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person
insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or in
some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
Id. § 78c(a)(5).
121. LrrrLE & RHODES, supra note 29, at 28. In a very small percentage of transactions,
broker-dealers execute exchange-listed stock orders in the OTC market. Nicholas Wolfson et
al., The Securities Markets: An Overview, 16 How. L.J. 809, 824 (1971). Such transactions are
said to be executed in the "third market." Id. Third market transactions have accounted for a
shrinking percentage of exchange-listed stock transactions. In 1969 the value of third market
transactions in NYSE-listed stocks comprised only 5.5% of the value of all NYSE-listed stock
activity. Id. at 824 n.l 15. In 1980 that percentage had declined to two percent. Norman S.
Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 894 (1981). In recent years, however, the third market has exper-
ienced renewed growth. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
122. LITrTLE & RHODES, supra note 29, at 30.
123. Compare infra part IV.A.I.a (discussing competitive structure of exchange markets)
with infra part IV.A.l.b (discussing competitive structure of OTC market).
124. Wolfson et al., supra note 121, at 815. A specialist is a member of the exchange to
whom the exchange allocates the trading of a specific stock. Poser, supra note 121, at 889.
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executing the stock trade on the exchange floor,12 that member proceeds
to the post belonging to the specialist in that stock. 126 If the order is a
"limit" order, the member simply leaves the order with the specialist,
which executes the order when the market price reaches the limit
price." 7 When executing a limit order, the specialist acts as a broker and
receives a commission from the member.
128
If, on the other hand, the customer's order is to buy or sell "at the
market," it is a "market order," and the member attempts to match the
order with a corresponding buy or sell order by an auction process in
front of the specialist's post.129 If the member succeeds in finding a
matching buyer or seller, the two parties execute the trade without the
assistance of the specialist.
If the market is not liquid, that is, if the market does not produce a
matching order at a price reasonably related to the last sale price, 130 then
the specialist must intervene and take up the other side of the trade by
During trading hours, the specialist remains at its post, which is simply a fixed location where
all member broker-dealers can congregate to trade the stock for which the specialist is respon-
sible. Therese H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?'--Proprietary Electronic Securities Trad-
ing Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833, 841-
42; Poser, supra note 121, at 889.
125. Only exchange members may execute stock trades on a particular stock exchange.
Maynard, supra note 124, at 840-41; Wolfson et al., supra note 121, at 812. If the broker-
dealer is not a member of the exchange at which it seeks to execute the trade, it must locate a
member and compensate the member with a commission for executing the trade on the broker-
dealer's behalf. Maynard, supra note 124, at 841; Poser, supra note 121, at 889; Wolfson et al.,
supra note 121, at 812-14.
126. Maynard, supra note 124, at 841-42.
127. Limit orders "require... brokers to buy at or below the stated (limit) price in the case
of a buy limit order, or alternatively, to sell at or above the stated (limit) price in the case of a
sell limit order." Id. at 841. For example, if a broker-dealer leaves the specialist a $40 sell
limit order for a stock currently trading at $391/s, the specialist does not execute the trade for
the customer until the market produces a $40 offer. The customer dictates the limit price at
which the specialist should execute the trade.
128. Poser, supra note 121, at 890.
129. The "auction process" is the means by which buy and sell order activity is centralized
at the specialist's post so that member broker-dealers can meet face to face and execute their
customers' orders with each other at the best price available. Maynard, supra note 124, at 841.
130. Poser, supra note 121, at 886 ("[L]iquidity [is] a market characteristic that enables
investors to dispose of or purchase securities at a price reasonably related to the preceding
price.").
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buying or selling from its own inventory.1 3 1 In this capacity, the special-
ist acts as a dealer.
132
In its dealer capacity, however, the specialist does not buy and sell
at the same price. Rather, the specialist buys stocks at its quoted "bid"
price and sells stocks at its quoted "ask" price. 133 The specialist sets the
bid price lower than the ask price so that it profits as it deals stocks with
the member broker-dealers at its post. The difference between the spe-
cialist's bid and ask prices is the "spread."
For example, a specialist may offer to buy stock at a quoted bid
price of $50, and offer to sell stock at a quoted ask price of $501/2. Its
profit is the spread, which is the fifty cents per share difference between
the quoted bid and ask prices.1
3 1
Notably, the specialist does not participate in all trades executed at
its post. The specialist only becomes involved with limit orders or at
times of market imbalance. Member broker-dealers auction off all other
orders at the specialist's post without the specialist's intervention. The
exchange specialist profits, therefore, when it acts as a dealer or when it
participates in a limit order transaction. Limit orders trigger a commis-
sion.135 When the specialist trades for its own account (as a dealer to
rectify market imbalances), it profits by buying stocks at a lower price
than that at which it sells.
The key to competition between exchange specialists is the dual
trading136 of stocks, which enables a broker-dealer to execute a single
stock trade on any one of several exchanges, for "[t]here is no bar to a
company's listing its securities on more than one stock exchange.'1 37
The "listing" standards of the several stock exchanges govern whether a
given stock may be traded on each exchange. 13  The NYSE and the
AMEX are the primary markets. 39 "The NYSE serves as the primary
131. The primary exchange specialist has a statutory obligation to maintain a "fair and
orderly market." 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-l(a)(2)(ii) (1992); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2104
(Nov. 1992) (rule 104.10(2)-(3)); 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9310 (July 1988) (rule
170(d)). The regional exchange specialist does not have the same obligation, except to the
extent that the rules of the regional exchange impose it. Wolfson et al., supra note 121, at 815
n.99. For a general discussion of this obligation, see id. at 815-19.
132. Maynard, supra note 124, at 842.
133. See Poser, supra note 121, at 890.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Stocks are dually traded when they are traded on more than one exchange, generally a
primary exchange and one or more regional exchanges. See id. at 893.
137. Id. at 888.
138. Id. Exchange listing standards "typically relate to matters such as share distribution,
amount of assets, and history of earnings." Id.
139. Maynard, supra note 124, at 844 n.53.
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market for the stocks listed there. On a much smaller scale, the AMEX
has historically served as the primary market for.., smaller, newer com-
panies."'" The regional exchanges primarily list stocks that are also
listed on the NYSE and the AMEX.
141
Some stock exchanges even grant unlisted trading privileges, 142 in
which case a stock need not be formally listed to be admitted for trading
on the exchange floor. 43 The SEC, which has the authority to regulate
such privileges, routinely grants permission for unlisted trading in stocks
that are already listed on another stock exchange.'"
Because the exchange specialist profits on some trades executed at
its post, and because a broker-dealer may be able to execute a stock trade
on only one of several exchanges that list the stock or grant it unlisted
trading privileges, the exchange specialist has an incentive to compete for
order flow. In other words, the exchange specialist has an incentive to
attract orders to its post that might otherwise be executed on another
exchange.
This framework, however, merely begs the question: How do ex-
change specialists compete for order flow and attract stock orders to
their posts? First, they can and do compete on service by lowering the
transaction costs associated with trading on the exchange. For example,
many regional exchanges retain automated small order execution systems
that circumvent the auction process and lower the costs of trading by
forcing a trade at the best quoted price available. 145 However, the bene-
fits of such competition are minimal. Service-based competition merely
eliminates the cost of finding the best matching price to an order, but it
does not affirmatively reduce the prices at which trades occur. 1
46
Second, and more importantly, the exchanges can conceivably com-
pete on price. Price competition requires specialists to narrow their bid-
ask spreads. For example, today, a specialist can narrow a spread de-
fined by a quoted bid of $401/4 and a quoted ask of $407/8 to a quoted bid
of $401/2 and a quoted ask of $403/4. The narrower spread attracts the
broker-dealer's order because if the market is not liquid at the time the
member tries to find a match, the specialist must act as a dealer and take
up the other side of the trade. 147 In that case, the broker-dealer prefers
140. Id. at 844.
141. Id. at 844 n.53.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 781(f) (1988).
143. Poser, supra note 121, at 888.
144. Id. at 888-89.
145. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
146. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2562.
147. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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the specialist with the narrower spread because the customer receives a
better price. In this example, if the broker-dealer's order is a buy order,
its customer must pay only $403/4 instead of $47/. Similarly, if the bro-
ker-dealer's order is a sell order, its customer will receive $401/2 instead
of $401/4. Although the specialist may not take up the other side of the
trade (in a liquid market), the narrow spread still attracts the order be-
cause of the possibility that the order may require the specialist's partici-
pation in an imbalanced market.
Exchange structure, then, suggests that exchange specialists, partic-
ularly on the regional exchanges, vigorously compete on price. However,
that is not the case. In today's securities markets, exchange specialists do
not systematically compete on price.148 Primary exchange specialists
have no incentive to compete given the large volume of trading that al-
ready occurs at their posts. 49 Regional exchange specialists have tried
to compete in the past, but failed because broker-dealers did not route
orders to the exchange that displayed the best quotation. 50 Broker-
dealers continued to route orders to the primary exchanges because of
the higher transaction costs associated with executing stock trades on the
regional exchanges.' 5 Thus, today, the regional exchanges are known as
"derivative" markets5 2 because regional exchange specialists do not
compete with the primary exchange specialists on the basis of their bid
and ask quotations.' 5 3 Rather, they mimic the price structure established
by the primary exchange specialists.
Another reason for the absence of price competition among ex-
change specialists is the practice of fractional stock pricing. Even if it
could attract order flow, a regional exchange specialist might bankrupt
itself by narrowing its spread. To narrow its spread, the specialist must
raise its quoted bid price or lower its quoted ask price by a minimum of
$1/ (12.5o) per share, the minimum "tick" by most exchange rules for
most stocks.'5 4 Multiplied by the number of shares in the average order,
148. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2556.
149. See supra note 9.
150. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2556.
151. See Poser, supra note 121, at 954 ("This practice, based on considerations of operating
efficiency and maximum opportunity to obtain a favorable execution price, serves to perpetuate
a particular exchange as the primary market.").
152. Derivative markets do not discover their own prices. Rather, they derive their prices
from those discovered in other markets. "'Price discovery involves the determination of the
price of a security through the interaction of supply and demand.'" Market 2000 Release,
supra note 2, at 1544 (quoting Letter from William Heyman, Director of SEC's Division of
Market Regulation, to Richard Breeden, Chairman of NYSE (July 3, 1991)).
153. Maynard, supra note 124, at 844 n.53; Poser, supra note 121, at 2555-56.
154. See supra notes 11-12.
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the exchange specialist would lose a significant amount of revenue on
every trade.
Moreover, an aggressively competitive specialist simply cannot nar-
row the spread beyond $1/8 (12.5¢) on the typical stock. For example,
once the specialist has narrowed the spread to $401/8 and $401/4 the spe-
cialist cannot narrow it any further. To do so would require the special-
ist to buy and sell at the same price, and the specialist would not profit
from the transaction.155
Therefore, fractions prohibit the specialist from narrowing the
spread in a financially feasible or efficient way. The result is a barrier to
competition that causes the investing public to buy at a higher price and
sell at a lower price whenever an exchange specialist participates in a
stock trade as a dealer.
The solution is decimal stock pricing. Decimal stock pricing would
enable exchange specialists to compete more effectively because a decimal
structure offers the exchange specialist a greater number of price points
per dollar at which it can set its bid and ask prices. Consequently, the
exchange specialist would not need to narrow the spread by a minimum
of 12.5o. Rather, if necessary to preserve its solvency, the specialist
could, for example, narrow the spread by 7o per share and distribute the
155. It may be'true that if the spread has been narrowed to $S/8, the price of the stock is so
low that under the rules of the exchanges, see supra note 11, quotes in intervals of $V 6 or even
smaller fractions would be permitted. However, smaller fractions do not fundamentally
change the analysis; rather, they simply shift to a finer level the extent to which an aggressively
competitive exchange specialist can no longer compete. When trading intervals fall to $1A6,
$V32 or even $1/4, the specialist cannot narrow the spread beyond 6.25r, 3.125o or 1.56r. In
isolation, the numbers seem insignificant, generating unrealistic competition. However, at the
prices at which such intervals would be necessary, spreads of 6¢ or smaller would be a signifi-
cant percentage of the price of the stock. Further, multiplied by the number of shares in the
average trade, individually small numbers amount to significant savings to the investor.
Some commentators have argued that exchange rules on fractional pricing should be lib-
eralized to permit trading in smaller fractions at lower minimum prices, or even for all stocks,
regardless of the price. See, eg., Harris, supra note 11 (studying likelihood of specialists' and
market makers' use, if permitted, of trading intervals of $1/16); Coffee, National Market System,
supra note 18, at 5 (suggesting that conversion to trading intervals of $1A6 or $2o may precede
conversion to decimals); LAWRENCE HARRIS, MINIMUM PRICE VARIATIONS, DISCRETE BID/
ASK SPREADS, AND QUOTATION TRANSPARENCY (NYSE Working Paper No. 91-42, Draft
1.3, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (studying
structural effects of conversion to trading intervals of $A6). These arguments fail to address
the fundamental problem: Fractional stock pricing, whether in intervals of s/,, $V16 or
smaller fractions, artificially limits the extent to which an exchange specialist can compete for
order flow on its quoted bid-ask spread. However, as these commentators have recognized, the
logistics and customs of U.S. stock markets may prevent a simple, quick conversion from
fractions to decimals. A conversion to trading in smaller fractions may be the first step toward
the ultimate goal of a conversion to trading in decimals. Coffee, National Market System,
supra note 18, at 5.
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savings to buyer and seller alike.15 6 Moreover, aggressively competitive
specialists could narrow the spread beyond the artificial 12.5o barrier and
achieve even tighter spreads.157
More importantly, competition generated by decimal stock pricing
would not be defeated by a derivative pricing model, because in the mod-
em stock markets, the incentive to price derivatively has been greatly
reduced. Automation of the securities markets and implementation of
the National Market System through the Consolidated Quotation Sys-
tem"5 ' have lowered, if not eliminated, the broker-dealer's transaction
costs associated with finding the best price. The broker-dealer's best exe-
cution obligation requires it to execute the trade on the exchange display-
ing the best quotation. 59 Hence, regional exchange specialists that could
not previously attract order flow in response to narrower spreads would
be able to do so under a decimal regime. The benefits would flow directly
to investors who would pay less to buy stocks and receive more to sell
them.1 6
0
b. the OTC market
The OTC market is fundamentally different from the exchange mar-
ket. In the OTC market, stock trades are not centralized on an exchange
156. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 18, at 567; Wloszczyna, supra note 13, at B3.
157. See Anne Schwimmer, Decimal System Debuts in Toronto, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
AGE, Dec. 9, 1991, at 10; Bernard Simon & Robert Gibbens, Toronto Abandons Dollar Frac-
tions, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, § I, at 35; Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at Cl; Victor F.
Zonana, SEC Weighs Decimal Stock Pricing System, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1991, at D2.
158. "The [Consolidated Quotation System (CQS)] gathers quotations from all [market
makers and exchange specialists] in exchange-listed stocks and disseminates them to vendors.
The... CQS quotation information [is] publicly available through vendors' desktop termi-
nals." Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1530; see also 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3,
at 2554-58 (discussing development of CQS); Seligman, supra note 18, at 90-93 (discussing
development of CQS).
159. See infra note 190 and accompanying text for a description of the best execution
obligation.
160. Wloszczyna, supra note 13, at B3. If decimals could narrow spreads by only 10r per
share, aggregate savings to investors would amount to $192 million per year. Seligman, supra
note 18, at 134. Professor Harris estimates that a conversion to a trading interval of $1/6
would reduce the average spread from 20.70 to 14.4¢. He further estimates (although less
reliably) that a conversion to a trading interval of $/32 would reduce the average spread to
11.20. HARRIS, supra note 155 (manuscript at 34). By implication, a conversion to decimals
would narrow the average spread even further, generating even greater savings for investors.
Although the impact of decimals would be greater for stocks trading under $10 per share (a
conversion to a trading interval of $'/16 for stocks trading under $10, for example, would nar-
row spreads for those stocks by 38%), the impact of decimals would nevertheless be significant
on all spreads for all stocks, regardless of price. For example, a conversion to a trading inter-
val of $'/16 would, on average, reduce spreads on stocks trading above $40 by 21%. Id. at 24.
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floor.16 1 Rather, the OTC market consists of a system of professional
dealers who publicize their bid and ask prices by computer.1 62 The most
significant portion of the OTC market is the NASD, which uses the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers' Automated Quotations System
(NASDAQ System) to publicize dealer quotes. 163 Although the OTC
market is structurally different from the exchange market, fractions have
caused similar problems.
In the OTC market the analog to the exchange specialist is the OTC
market maker." Like the specialist in the exchange market, not all
trades for OTC-listed stocks involve market makers. When a broker-
dealer receives an order to buy or sell an OTC-listed stock it may, acting
as a principal, take up the other side of the trade and charge a commis-
sion for its services.165 If, however, the broker-dealer does not frequently
deal in the stock or is simply unwilling to act as a principal, it may ar-
range for a market maker to take up the other side of the trade.' 66 Upon
execution, the broker-dealer receives a commission or a mark-up for its
services. 1
67
The market maker, on the other hand, profits in the same way that
the exchange specialist profits when the specialist behaves as a dealer.
The market maker buys stocks at its quoted bid price and sells stocks at
its quoted ask price, and profits on the spread.' 68 Just as exchange spe-
cialists face competition from the dual listing of stocks and the potential
for execution on another exchange floor, so too do market makers face
competition from other market makers in the same stocks.
Unlike exchange specialists, however, market makers compete on
price. 69 In 1982 the average OTC stock had 7.6 market makers. 170 The
NASDAQ System publishes and continuously updates each market
maker's bid and ask quotes, 71 which are instantaneously accessible via
161. Maynard, supra note 124, at 846.
162. Id. at 846-47.
163. See Seligman, supra note 18, at 95-96.
164. A market maker is any broker-dealer that "with respect to securities, holds himself out
(by entering quotations in an inter-dealer communication system or otherwise) as being willing
to buy and sell such security for his own account on a regular or continuous basis." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(38) (1988).
165. Maynard, supra note 124, at 846; Poser, supra note 121, at 894.
166. See Maynard, supra note 124, at 846; Poser, supra note 121, at 894.
167. Maynard, supra note 124, at 846; Poser, supra note 121, at 894.
168. See Maynard, supra note 124, at 846.
169. Seligman, supra note 18, at 95.
170. Id. Actively traded stocks may have as many as 20 to 30 market makers. Maynard,
supra note 124, at 849; Poser, supra note 121, at 895; Seligman, supra note 18, at 95.
171. Maynard, supra note 124, at 847.
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computer to every NASD member broker-dealer. 172 Because of the large
number of market makers per stock, and because market makers' quotes
are so well advertised, no single market maker in any stock can thwart
favorable price competition. 7 3 It is a simple and inexpensive process for
any broker-dealer to find the best quoted price for its order and to exe-
cute accordingly.' 74 In the OTC market, the incentive to compete on
price is strong.
1 75
Therefore, to the extent that OTC market makers attempt to narrow
their bid-ask spreads to attract order flow, fractions have not inhibited
competition. Nevertheless, fractions complicate trading in the OTC mar-
ket in a manner similar to the manner by which they complicate trading
in the exchange markets. The minimum 12.5r increment in stock prices
may discourage otherwise competitive market makers from narrowing
their spreads because they might be unable to afford to substantially re-
duce their profits. 176 Further, they cannot narrow spreads beyond 12.5¢
per share. 77 Collectively, market makers benefit from the artificially in-
flated spreads, but the investing public loses the opportunity to execute
trades at prices discovered by free and uninhibited market forces.
In the same way that decimal stock pricing would cure these ineffi-
ciencies in the exchange markets, it would also cure similar inefficiencies
in the OTC market. Decimals would allow market makers to narrow
spreads beyond the artificial limit imposed by fractions and to compete
without requiring them to narrow spreads by a minimum of 12.5p. 171
The resulting increase in competition would benefit the investing public.
2. Indirect price competition: Payment for order flow
Payment for order flow is "the practice of market makers or ex-
change specialists compensating [broker-dealers] for directing customer
orders to them."' 79 When a broker-dealer directs a customer's order to a
particular exchange specialist or to a specific OTC market maker, the
specialist or market maker may compensate the broker-dealer with a re-
172. Poser, supra note 121, at 895 n.47.
173. See Wolfson et al., supra note 121, at 823.
174. See Seligman, supra note 18, at 96-101.
175. Id. at 95.
176. See supra text accompanying note 154.
177. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
179. Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537. Payment for order flow also has been
described as the practice of exchange specialists and OTC market makers buying orders from
broker-dealers. See Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at C20.
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bate, usually about two cents per share.18 0 Payment for order flow, then,
is indirect price competition because the rebate attracts orders without
altering the bid and ask prices at which exchange specialists and market
makers trade stocks. The competition is not for the customer's business,
but for the broker-dealer's.
18 1
The practice of payment for order flow is not new. In recent years,
however, it has rewarded broker-dealers with rebates in an increasing
number of stock transactions.1 8 2 Moreover, it has permitted the recent
fast growth of the third market in which OTC market makers compete
with exchange specialists for buy and sell orders of exchange-listed
stocks.18 3 Ostensibly welcome as a spur to competition between market
centers, the practice is subject to much criticism.
18 4
The foremost criticism is that the competition manifested by pay-
ment for order flow benefits broker-dealers rather than their custom-
180. Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 5. Payment for order flow practices also
include nonmonetary forms of compensation:
It should be noted that there is a debate among the commentators about precisely
what types of practices should be deemed to involve payment for order flow. [Some]
commentators argue that other forms of economic incentives to direct order flow to a
particular market are, at least, the economic equivalent of payment for order flow.
Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537 n.54.
Soft dollar payments are similar to payments for order flow in that soft dollar payments
involve "brokerage firms offering services, such as research, to money managers to obtain or-
der flow and the commission revenues that the orders produce." Dingell to Introduce Order
Flow Bill; Criticizes SECfor Inaction on Issue, BNA WASH. INSIDER, Mar. 18, 1992, at 7. Soft
dollar practices create many of the same problems as payment for order flow practices, see
infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text, because both practices are means by which OTC
market makers and regional exchange specialists compete for order flow without altering their
bid and ask prices. Therefore, a conversion to decimals, by curing the problems associated
with payment for order flow, would also implicitly cure the problems associated with the re-
lated practice of soft dollar payments.
181. Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 5.
182. See Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537; Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra
note 18, at 5. "The [SEC] has estimated that 30 percent to 40 percent of trades may involve
some form of compensation for order flow, including cash rebates." Study Shows Small Inves-
tors Pay Less on NYSE Than Most Other Exchanges, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar, 7, 1992, at
D5.
183. See Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 5. For a discussion of the third
market, see supra note 121.
184. See generally Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537-38 (discussing commenta-
tors' various criticisms of payment for order flow); Simon & Colby, supra note 18, at 97 ("Pay-
ment for order flow theoretically reflects heightened competition for orders, and as such, could
benefit investors if properly directed. In its present form, however, this practice has a dubious
reputation . . . ."); Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 5-6, 31 ("But doesn't this
practice amount to paying a bribe to the broker? Isn't it a clear fiduciary breach for brokers to
receive an undisclosed side payment in transactions where they are serving as agents for their
customers?").
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ers.' 8 Currently, regardless of whether and to what extent broker-
dealers are under an obligation to disclose these payments to their cus-
tomers,1 86 customers generally are not aware of them.1 87 Therefore, the
rebates directly reduce broker-dealers' transaction costs188 but, because
customers are not aware of the rebates, those costs are not reflected in
lower commission rates. Consequently, investors lose approximately $47
million to $55 million per year.
1 89
A second criticism is that payment for order flow may interfere with
the broker-dealer's best execution obligation. 90 Best execution requires
the broker-dealer to execute its customer's order "so that the customer's
total cost or proceeds are the most favorable under the circum-
stances." '191 When a potential rebate makes it cheaper for the broker-
dealer to execute the order in a market displaying an inferior bid or ask
price, the broker-dealer has an incentive to execute the order in that mar-
ket even though execution there would not necessarily be the most
favorable to the customer.'92 Further, rebate mechanics often require a
broker-dealer to aggregate orders to receive a rebate.193 Such aggrega-
tion also may deprive the individual customer of best execution because
the broker-dealer does not provide execution on an order-by-order
basis. 194 Rather, the broker-dealer may execute its customer's order at
an inferior price because the broker-dealer must aggregate that cus-
tomer's order with other orders to receive a volume-based rebate.'95
The existence of rebates signals the intention of exchange specialists
and OTC market makers to compete for order flow based on price. Be-
cause they will receive the same net price regardless of whether they offer
185. Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537-38; Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note
18, at 31 ("Put very simply, price competition is a good thing, but its benefits are supposed to
benefit the customer, not the customer's agent.").
186. For a discussion of potential sources of the broker-dealer's duty to disclose rebates to
its customer, see Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 5-6, 31.
187. Simon & Colby, supra note 18, at 97 ("The natural temptation with regard to sales of
order flow, given the customer's predictable misunderstanding of the practice, is to not disclose
the sale at all.... [N]otice generally is included in confirmation fine print, leaving customers
uninformed of the true nature of order flow sales practices.").
188. Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537.
189. SEC Criticized For Lack of Interest in Payment For Order Flow, SEC. WK., Mar. 16,
1992, at 2.
190. Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537-38; Simon & Colby, supra note 18, at 97;
Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 5; Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at C20.
191. Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1536.
192. See Congressman Says SECs Order Flow Study Should Be Comprehensive, SEC. WK.,
Apr. 6, 1992, at 3.
193. Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1538.
194. Id.
195. See id.
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a rebate or narrow their spreads, why do exchange specialists and market
makers choose to offer rebates?
First, to the extent that specialists and market makers are willing to
compete on price, they may be willing to do so only in small incre-
ments. 196 When a specialist or market maker seeks to compete by offer-
ig to buy at one or two cents more per share, or sell at one or two cents
less per share, it cannot do so by narrowing the spread in a fractional
regime. Fractional stock pricing requires the specialist or market maker
to compete in increments of 12.5o or more.197
Second, payment for order flow permits exchange specialists and
OTC market makers to engage in price discrimination.' 98 A narrower
bid-ask spread forces the specialist or market maker to buy at a higher
price or to sell at a lower price on all trades.1 99 Conversely, rebates allow
them to buy at a higher price or to sell at a lower price only when neces-
sary to attract a particular order.2 "° Many specialists and market makers
offer rebates only for trades in stocks with large spreads so that others
must transact the less profitable business.20 1 Specialists and market mak-
ers use rebates, then, to target specific orders for competitive pricing.
Many commentators have suggested various solutions to the prob-
lem of payment for order flow. For example, they argue that, by SEC or
SRO rule, broker-dealers should be obligated to either disclose,20 2 or pass
through,20 3 to their customers any rebates received from specialists or
market makers in exchange for orders. Alternatively, to the extent that
payment for order flow constitutes price discrimination, it may be pro-
hibited under state or federal antitrust laws.2" Representative John
196. See Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 31; Coffee, National Market System,
supra note 18, at 7.
197. See Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 31; Coffee, National Market System,
supra note 18, at 7.
198. Coffee, National Market System, supra note 18, at 7.
199. See id.
200. Ia
201. Id.
202. In April 1990, the NASD sought SEC approval of a proposed rule change that would
have required a broker-dealer to disclose, by written statement, any payments received for
directing order flow to a particular specialist or market maker. Proposed Rule Change Relat-
ing to Disclosure of Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 28,020, 46 SEC
Docket (CCH) 325 (May 15, 1990).
203. In May 1990, the MSE proposed that the SEC adopt a rule that would require broker-
dealers to, among other things, remit to their customers cash payments received from any
market maker in exchange for broker-dealers' orders. Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note
18, at 31. The SEC never formally published the MSE's proposal, and in October 1991, the
MSE withdrew its petition. Id.
204. See Barbara Franklin, Stock Inquiry Looks at Fees For 'Steering' 'Order Flow' Pay-
ments to Brokers Questioned, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 1990, at 5.
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Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, has
demanded that the SEC resolve the payment for order flow problem and
has threatened to introduce legislation prohibiting it.2" 5 Finally, the SEC
has indicated that the practice of payment for order flow will be a central
focus of its pending study of the securities markets.20 6 The objective of
any solution, however, should be to preserve the competitive energy
manifested in the practice of payment for order flow and to direct its
benefits toward the investing public.20 7
The simplest solution, then, may be to eliminate specialists' and
market makers' incentive to use rebates by converting to decimal stock
prices. By converting to decimals, specialists and market makers that are
unable to compete in 12.5o increments could divert their competitive en-
ergies from rebates to narrower spreads because decimals would allow
them to narrow spreads by the one or two cents per share that they cur-
rently offer as rebates.208 One commentator has suggested that "[s]uch a
system fosters open and visible competition and, coupled with the duty of
best execution, would predictably narrow the [bid-ask] spread. If
adopted, no legitimate argument for rebates would remain."209
Decimal pricing alone, however, cannot eliminate the practice be-
cause it cannot reduce the incentive to discriminate on price. Therefore,
although decimals would preserve and redirect competitive energy to
narrower spreads and, thus, redirect the benefits of competition from
broker-dealers to the investing public, either legislation or an SEC rule
should proscribe the practice altogether to prevent "selective" competi-
tion based upon price discrimination.
B. Competition for International Order Flow
Increasingly, domestic stock markets face competition for order
flow not just from other domestic market centers, but also from foreign
market centers.210 The principal rivals of U.S. stock markets for interna-
205. See Congressman Says SEC's Order Flow Study Should Be Comprehensive, supra note
192, at 3.
206. See Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1538.
207. Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 31.
208. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 18, at 567.
209. Coffee, Brokers and Bribery, supra note 18, at 31. But see Torres & Salwen, supra note
12, at C20 (quoting market maker that claims decimals are "'certainly not going to change
anything regarding payment for order flow' ").
210. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 23. "Most international se-
curities trading now involves debt securities rather than equities. To what extent this global-
ization will also apply to corporate equities, and how quickly, is somewhat uncertain, but by
most measures it is well underway." Id. Both foreign investment in U.S. equities and U.S.
investment in foreign equities have increased:
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tional order flow are the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and London's
International Stock Exchange (LSE).211 Other European markets, par-
ticularly the German exchanges, the Paris bourse and the Swiss ex-
changes, have also begun to vigorously compete for international order
flow.212 Much of this increase is attributable to automation of the global
securities markets.2" 3 "Global telecommunications shrink distances and
time differences, tie together national economies, and thus encourage the
growth of securities trading across national boundaries." '214
Significant barriers to international competition for order flow re-
main.2" 5 Nevertheless, automation has reduced the transaction costs as-
sociated with extraterritorial execution of stock orders.21 6 Consequently,
domestic broker-dealers are increasingly likely to satisfy their best execu-
tion obligation by sending their customers' orders overseas.21 7 Likewise,
foreign broker-dealers can take advantage of better stock prices in U.S.
stock markets at a lower cost. Because U.S. exchange specialists and
OTC market makers profit on all trades in which they are involved,218
both have an incentive to compete for international order flow.
The practice of pricing stocks in fractions, however, may place U.S.
stock markets at a competitive disadvantage. Fractions require U.S. ex-
change specialists and OTC market makers to set their bid and ask
Net foreign purchases of United States equities increased from $3.9 billion in 1982 to
$5.2 billion in 1983 ... United States investment in foreign equities has also increased
through the years. It has been estimated that United States institutions now hold
$10-413 billion in foreign stocks, compared to $1-2 billion five to ten years ago.
Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the World Securities
Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 32 SEC Docket (CCH) 1241, 1243 (Apr. 18,
1985).
211. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 3.
212. Id.
213. See Manning G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achieve-
ments of the European Communities, HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 186 (1990).
214. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 1; see also Carolyn B. Claw-
son, Comment, International Securities Markets: Will 24-Hour Trading Make a Difference?,
16 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 393, 393 (1988) (discussing effect of automation on interna-
tional securities trading).
215. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 2. Such barriers include dif-
fering legal and regulatory structures and cultural differences between nations and markets.
Id.
216. See id. at 1.
217. Because automation reduces the transaction costs associated with extra-territorial exe-
cution, a broker-dealer can execute its customer's trade overseas at a lower cost. Accordingly,
the chance that the best overall available price is at a foreign exchange has increased with the
advent of global securities trading. For a definition of the broker-dealer's best execution obli-
gation, see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 124-35, 161-68 and accompanying text.
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quotes in increments of $1/8 (12.5o).219 Because currency formats and
securities regulations vary in the international markets, foreign ex-
changes do not trade stocks in the same intervals.220 As barriers to inter-
national competition for order flow collapse, discrepancies in trading
intervals between international markets may determine which of those
markets can most effectively compete for cross-border trades. Therefore,
because the TSE and the LSE dominate international securities trading,
the trading intervals on those exchanges are crucial to the competitive-
ness of U.S. exchange specialists and OTC market makers in a global
market.
On the TSE, Japanese broker-dealers 221 currently publish bid and
ask quotes in 8o intervals for stocks trading for more than $8 per share,
or 0.8o for lower-priced stocks, which are more common.2 22 On the fully
automated LSE,223 British market makers publish bid and ask quotes in
intervals of only 1.5o.224 Therefore, the U.S. stock markets' two most
powerful foreign competitors for international order flow quote stock
prices in significantly smaller intervals.
219. See supra notes 11, 155 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 222, 224, 228-30 and accompanying text.
221. There are two types of market participants on the TSE: regular members and Saitori.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 38. Neither regular members nor
Saitori perform functions similar to those performed by U.S. market makers or exchange spe-
cialists. Saitori keep trading records and match buy and sell orders but do not participate as
principals in trades executed at the exchange. Id. at 39. Regular members are the Japanese
equivalent of U.S. broker-dealers in that they receive orders from their customers and either
trade as dealers for their own accounts or, as brokers, take the orders to the TSE in an attempt
to find matching buy or sell orders. Id. This Comment refers to the regular members of the
TSE as "Japanese broker-dealers."
222. Japanese securities regulations require the TSE's regular members to trade in incre-
ments of 10 yen when the price of the stock exceeds 1000 yen and, otherwise, in increments of
one yen. HARRIS, supra note 155 (manuscript at 26). On January 18, 1993, 126.08 yen traded
for one U.S. dollar. See WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at Cl. Thus, 1000 yen equates to $7.93, a
10 yen trading increment equates to 7.93c, and a one yen trading increment equates to 0.79;.
Lower-priced stocks are more common. Of the 218 TSE-listed stocks quoted on January
20, 1993, 135 (greater than 60%) were quoted at prices less than 1000 yen and, thus, in trading
intervals of one yen, or 0.8r. See id. at C6. Therefore, a 0.8c trading interval is more common
on the TSE.
223. The LSE closely resembles the NASD's OTC market. Compare infra part IV.A.I.b
with OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 44-45. British market makers
display their bid and ask quotes on a computer network. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 6, at 44. Although trades may take place over the telephone or on the
exchange floor, most British market makers have abandoned trading on the exchange floor in
favor of telephone trading. Id.
224. Of the 105 LSE-listed stocks quoted on January 20, 1993, 96 traded in increments of
one pence. See WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at C6. The remaining nine traded in increments of
1/2 pence. See id. On January 18, 1993, 0.65 British pounds and 65 pence traded for one U.S.
dollar. See id. at Cl. Therefore, a one pence trading interval equates to 1.540.
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The effect of this discrepancy could well be a diversion of order flow
from domestic markets to the TSE and the LSE. By virtue of their
smaller trading intervals, Japanese broker-dealers and British market
makers can achieve tighter spreads than their U.S. counterparts. As the
securities markets become more global, broker-dealers that ordinarily ex-
ecute trades in U.S. markets may instead route their orders to the TSE or
LSE, where narrower spreads represent more attractive pricing.
For example, suppose that a U.S. broker-dealer seeks to sell 10,000
shares of a stock trading at a U.S. bid price of $71/s. The equivalent TSE
price is 898 yen, and the equivalent LSE price is 463 pence. To attract
that broker-dealer's order to the TSE, a Japanese broker-dealer can raise
its quoted bid price to 900 yen. Similarly, a British market maker can
attract that order to the LSE by raising its quoted bid price to 465 pence.
In an increasingly global securities market, the U.S. exchange spe-
cialist or the OTC market maker must also raise its quoted bid price to
remain competitive or risk losing the order to a foreign exchange. After
all, in a 10,000 share sell order, a two yen increase of the TSE bid price
generates $159 more income for the broker-dealer's customer. Similarly,
a two pence increase of the LSE bid price generates $308 more income.
In attempting to compete with the TSE and the LSE for that order,
however, the U.S. exchange specialist or the OTC market maker faces a
dilemma. On the one hand, it may not be able to afford to raise its
quoted bid price by $1/s. On the other hand, even if it could, Japanese
broker-dealers and British market makers could respond once again by
adding a couple yen or a couple pence per share to their quoted bid
prices. At some point, the U.S. exchange specialist or the OTC market
maker would be unable to compete and would lose the order to a foreign
exchange. Fractions, therefore, portend a significant diversion of order
flow from domestic to foreign stock markets.
Fortunately for the U.S. markets, internationalization of the global
stock markets is not complete.2 Although the transaction costs associ-
ated with cross-border stock trading have been reduced, they have not
yet been eliminated.226 Until they have been eliminated, U.S. exchange
specialists and OTC market makers have time to find and implement a
solution that would level the global competitive playing field.
Once again, that solution is to force the U.S. stock markets to con-
vert to decimal stock pricing. Such a conversion would permit U.S. ex-
change specialists and market makers to compete for international order
225. See supra notes 210, 215 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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flow in increments of 1¢. The TSE and the LSE, which quote stock
prices in intervals of 0.80 and 1.5o respectively,227 would be unable to
take advantage of currency exchange rates to significantly outbid U.S.
stock markets for international order flow. Although fluctuations in cur-
rency exchange rates may alter their relative positions, a conversion to
decimals would, at a minimum, protect U.S. exchange specialists and
OTC market makers to the fullest extent permitted by the structure of
U.S. currency.
Finally, even under the current fraction format, the trading ratios of
some foreign currencies have made U.S. stock markets more effective
competitors for international order flow than some internationally com-
petitive, but less powerful foreign exchanges. The Swiss exchanges, for
example, quote stocks in increments of 670 to $6.67.22s The Paris bourse
quotes stocks in increments of 180.229 Only the German exchanges can
match the ability of the TSE and the LSE to compete more effectively
than the U.S. exchanges for international order flow because the German
exchanges quote stocks in intervals of 61.230 At current exchange rates, a
conversion to decimals would eliminate the competitive gap between the
U.S. stock markets and the German exchanges and it would widen the
gap between the U.S. markets and the Paris bourse and Swiss exchanges.
V. THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
The arguments for converting to decimal stock quotes are strong.
Decimals would promote domestic competition by encouraging direct
price competition for domestic order flow and by discouraging the prac-
tice of payment for order flow. 231  Further, decimals would enable do-
mestic stock markets to compete more effectively for international order
flow.23 2 As a result, the investing public would benefit from a conversion
227. See supra notes 222, 224 and accompanying text.
228. Of the 19 Swiss exchange-listed stocks quoted on January 20, 1993, eight were quoted
in intervals of one Swiss franc, two were quoted in intervals of five Swiss francs and nine were
quoted in intervals often Swiss francs. See WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at C6. At a conversion
rate of 1.5 Swiss francs per one U.S. dollar, the Swiss exchanges trade stocks in intervals of 670
to $6.67. See id. at Cl.
229. Of the 29 Paris bourse-listed stocks quoted for January 20, 1993, 19 were quoted in
intervals of one franc and the remaining 10 were quoted in intervals of 'Ao franc. See id. at C6.
At a conversion rate of 5.53 francs to one U.S. dollar, the Paris bourse primarily quotes stocks
in intervals of 18.1o. See id. at Cl.
230. All 32 of the German exchange-listed stocks quoted for January 20, 1993 were quoted
in intervals of '/o of a German mark. See id at C6. At a conversion rate of 1.63 German
marks per one U.S. dollar, the German exchanges primarily trade stocks in intervals of 6.1€.
See id. at Cl.
231. See supra part IV.A.
232. See supra part IV.B.
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to decimals through narrower spreads, and the stock markets would ben-
efit through increased international order flow.
Although some market participants believe that a conversion to
decimals is inevitable,233 U.S. stock markets have resisted efforts to con-
vert.234 Their resistance is, in part, due to the prohibitive costs of con-
verting computers to handle decimal trading2 35 and the alleged adverse
effects on market liquidity. 236 More importantly, however, their resist-
ance may be due simply to their fear of generalized competition.
A. The Stock Markets
The primary exchanges oppose a conversion to decimal stock pric-
ing. William Donaldson, chairman and chief executive of the NYSE, has
stated: "'If there is a public demand [for decimal stock prices], which I
don't believe there is, we would go for it, but to change something just to
change it is probably wasteful.' "237 James Jones, chairman of the
AMEX, has similarly opposed a conversion.238
The primary exchanges' reluctance to embrace decimal stock pric-
ing is understandable--decimals breed competition and competition di-
verts revenue-generating domestic order flow from the primary
exchanges to the regional exchanges.239 What Donaldson has failed to
recognize, however, is that there has been public demand for decimals.
240
233. See Opposed to Shift to Decimal Pricing, SEC. WK., June 17, 1991, at 10; Torres &
Salwen, supra note 12, at C1 (" 'I think it is inevitable that the system goes to smaller frac-
tions, and then even to' decimals." (quoting broker-dealer)); see also William Gruber, Record-
breaking MSE is on a Roll, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1990, at C4 (discussing MSE chairman John
Weithers's outlook for 1990s, which includes belief that "decimals will replace fractions in
quoting stock prices").
234. See infra part V.A.
235. See infra part V.B.
236. See infra part V.C.
237. Zonana, supra note 157, at D2.
238. See SEC Chairman Cool to Idea of Decimal Point Quotes, BC CYCLE, June 12, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ("'It is such a tradition and a mode of operation in the
industry for so long that it would be a substantial change, and frankly I am not looking for
ways to increase costs.. . ."' (quoting James Jones)).
239. See infra part V.C.
240. See Wloszczyna, supra note 13, at B3 ("'We're all for it.'" (quoting John Markese,
Executive Vice President of American Association of Individual Investors, regarding conver-
sion to decimal stock pricing)). To the extent that the public demand for decimals has been
somewhat muted, it is presumably because those who would most benefit from a conversion
are those who are least able to publicize their interests because they lack organizational power.
For example, small investors generally prefer a conversion to decimals because they benefit
from narrower spreads and are not harmed by the specter of a decrease in market depth. See
HARRIS, supra note 155 (manuscript at 5). Conversely, large institutional traders may not be
as eager to convert to decimals because although they benefit from narrower spreads, they are
significantly harmed by a decrease in market depth. See id. For a discussion of the effect of
[Vol. 26:843
April 1993] DECIMAL STOCK PRICING
Moreover, a conversion to decimals would be neither wasteful nor a
change merely for change's sake. Rather, decimal stock pricing would
create real benefits for both investors and the exchanges. 241 In reality,
Donaldson's concern with unnecessary change probably masks his more
fundamental fear of generalized price competition, which threatens to
erode the NYSE's near monopoly of the auction trading of securities.
Thus, the primary exchanges fear that decimal-based price competi-
tion would ultimately benefit the regional exchanges through a shift in
order flow. Conversely, the regional exchanges and small OTC market
makers (smaller markets) fear that decimal-based price competition
would take the form of a generalized price war that only the primary
exchanges and the largest, most financially stable market makers (larger
markets) would be able to survive.242
The fears of the smaller markets are unwarranted. First, by con-
verting to decimals, their revenues would decline only slightly because
narrower spreads would generate an offsetting increase in the volume of
stocks traded.243 Second, the SEC has a vested interest in maintaining
the viability of the regional exchanges. 2" By insisting that the stock
markets trade in decimals, therefore, the SEC would not also insist that
the smaller markets sink or swim in the ensuing price competition. In-
deed, the SEC has historically protected the smaller markets from possi-
ble extinction due to increased competition.24 There is no reason to
decimals on market liquidity and depth, see infra part V.C. Small traders may not have the
organizational power to mount a campaign demanding a conversion to decimals. Presumably,
those with the power to do so, the institutional traders, simply have not been vocal due to their
ambivalence on the decimal issue.
241. See supra part IV.
242. See Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at Cl, C20 ("[Decimals] would... make for
fierce competition in the pricing of stocks, leaving little room for smaller securities firms that
need a minimum 12.5 cent spread to survive as [dealers].").
243. One study indicates that, following a conversion to trading in intervals of $/16, for
stocks trading below $10, a 38% reduction in the size of the average spread would be almost
completely offset by a 34% increase in volume. HARRIS, supra note 155 (manuscript at 24-25).
For stocks trading over $40, however, a 21% reduction in the size of the spread would create
only a 2.6% increase in volume. Id.
244. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST 108-10 (1981); Werner, supra note 92, at 778. Phillips and Zecher posit that the SEC
harbors "considerable concern for the survival of the regionals" because: (1) regulatory agen-
cies such as the SEC believe that the failure of a regulated entity reflects poorly on the agency's
regulatory efforts; and (2) the SEC would be subjected to substantial criticism if the regional
exchanges were permitted to fail and leave the NYSE with a monopoly in the securities trading
markets. PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra, at 108-09.
245. PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 244, at 108-09.
[T]he SEC has consistently acted to preserve the regional exchanges. In spite of
constant urging by Congress, the SEC has yet to lift the NYSE Rule 390 which
requires its exchange members to clear the floor of an exchange before taking trades
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:843
believe that the SEC would refuse to extend that same protection after
mandating a conversion to decimals.
Finally, notwithstanding the SEC's paternalism, the smaller markets
might still survive the competitive prowess of the larger markets. The
smaller markets already indirectly compete on price with the larger mar-
kets through the practice of payment for order flow. 246 This indirect
price competition has not yet sounded the death knell of the smaller mar-
kets. Furthermore, market fragmentation247 already has begun to erode
the NYSE's monopoly on the auction trading of securities.248 The bene-
ficiaries of that fragmentation have, generally, been the regional ex-
changes, third market makers and off-exchange automated execution
systems. 249 Thus, the NYSE may no longer have the resources necessary
to survive fierce price competition. The price war that the regional ex-
changes and smaller market makers fear may never materialize. Even if
such a price war does develop, it will not necessarily culminate in the
extinction of the regional exchanges.
B. Costs of Conversion
All groups contend that the costs of converting computer systems to
handle decimals would be prohibitive.250 Donaldson estimates that the
costs of conversion would exceed several hundred million dollars.25'
Even if Donaldson's estimates are correct, the benefits to investors, mani-
fested in narrower spreads, would far exceed the costs of conversion.
off board. That rule has forced the third market into an exchange format (such as
the Cincinnati Stock Exchange) to remain competitive. The SEC has mandated inte-
grated sale- and quotation-reporting systems that give equal billing to the regionals
for advertisement .... The SEC, in granting options to the regionals and not the
NYSE, ensures success to one business group at the expense of its major competitor.
Id. at 108.
246. See supra part IV.A.2.
247. "Market fragmentation" is the diversion of order flow from one or two primary mar-
kets to many different markets, including the regional exchanges, the third market and off-
exchange automated execution systems. See Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1532-36.
Although the extent of market fragmentation is unknown, it unquestionably exists to some
degree in the modem stock markets. Id. at 1533. Experts debate the advantages of market
fragmentation. Id. Some view it as a necessary but harmful side effect of generally favorable
competition between stock markets. Id. Others believe that the disadvantages of market frag-
mentation-primarily liquidity shortfalls on the primary exchanges-outweigh any benefits to
be gained from service-based or price competition. Id.
248. Ia
249. Id.
250. In 1991 the SEC asked the Securities Industry Automation Corporation, which runs
the central quote system for U.S. stock exchanges, to study the costs of converting to decimals.
Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at Cl. The SEC did not pursue the request. See infra text
accompanying notes 263-64.
251. See Zonana, supra note 157, at D2.
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One expert has estimated that a conversion to decimal trading would
generate savings for investors of nearly $200 million per year."' 2 In a
very short time, then, the savings to investors would surpass the costs to
the exchanges and the OTC market.
It would not be inequitable for the stock markets to bear the costs of
conversion: Investors have borne the costs of fractions for two hundred
years. Assuming that these short-term costs would be passed through to
investors in the form of inflated spreads, the investing public would still
benefit in the long term. It would only take a few years of narrower
spreads to compensate for the several hundred million dollars in conver-
sion costs that would be passed through in broader spreads. Beyond that
short time frame, investors would reap the benefits of decimals and nar-
rower spreads.
C. Liquidity
The stock markets contend that decimals would reduce liquidity
25 3
in two ways. First, they argue that by diverting order flow away from
the primary exchanges, decimals would fragment the stock markets so
that no single exchange specialist or market maker could ensure that
there would be a match to any buy or sell order at a price reasonably
related to the price of the immediately preceding sale. 5 a Second, they
argue that by reducing spreads, decimals would render broker-dealers
less willing to risk their own money as dealers to complete trades and
would, therefore, reduce the number of participants in the market.255
Accordingly, there would be a smaller chance that a broker-dealer could,
as a broker, find matching buy or sell orders for its customers.
25 6
However, it is not certain that overall liquidity would decrease.
Although narrower spreads would generate increased volume,25 7 quoted
252. See supra note 160.
253. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Liquidity can be conceived of as a func-
tion of volume and depth. Volume is simply the number of shares traded at a market center.
Depth is the quoted number of shares that an exchange specialist or OTC market maker is
willing to trade at its quoted bid or ask price. An increase in depth or volume should increase
liquidity at a market center because an increase in either depth or volume increases the likeli-
hood that an investor can trade the number of shares desired at a price reasonably related to
the immediately preceding sale price.
254. See Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at Cl.
255. See id.; Zonana, supra note 157, at D2.
256. See Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at Cl; Zonana, supra note 157, at D2.
257. See Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at C20; Zonana, supra note 157, at D2; supra note
243. In September 1991 the Toronto Stock Exchange converted from fractions to nickel and
penny decimals on its "Toronto 35 Index Participation Units" (TIPs). Simon & Gibbens,
supra note 157, at 35. Since the conversion, average daily volume of TIPs transactions has
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depth-the quantity at which an exchange specialist or OTC market
maker will accept an order to buy or sell at its quoted bid or ask price-
would decrease.2" 8 Therefore, liquidity would increase for small inves-
tors, for whom a decrease in the average depth of quoted bid and ask
prices would be largely immaterial. Liquidity would decrease for larger
investors, who demand significant depth before they will participate in
the market. The overall effect on liquidity, therefore, would be
uncertain.259
At the same time that decimals would fragment order flow, they
would increase the total volume of trading in the stock markets. 260 Thus,
although liquidity would decrease on the primary exchanges, liquidity
would increase on the regional exchanges and in the OTC market. This
shift in liquidity would reflect the shift in order flow from the primary
exchanges to the regional exchanges due to increased competition in the
stock markets. Just as generalized price competition would not necessar-
ily cause the extinction of the smaller markets, it also would not cause
broker-dealers to drop out of the dealer business. Once again, revenues
lost to narrower spreads are recouped through increased volume. Argu-
ments against decimal stock pricing based on liquidity are generally spe-
cious: They mask a more fundamental fear of price competition.
VI. PROPOSAL
The SEC has a statutory obligation to promote competition among
market centers and to ensure that the SROs adopt rules designed to pro-
tect the investing public from market abuses.26' Fractional stock pricing
inhibits competition among market centers and, thus, fails to protect the
investing public from artificially inflated spreads.262 Therefore, the SEC
has an obligation to adopt a decimal stock pricing rule to remedy the
failures of the SROs and to give the investing public the benefits of nar-
rower spreads.
Nevertheless, the SEC has never seriously considered adopting such
a rule. In June 1991 the SEC consulted with the Securities Industry
Automation Corporation (SIAC), which runs the central quote system
for the U.S. stock exchanges, regarding the cost of converting to
increased from 220,000 to 300,000 shares. Michael Ellis, U.S. Investors May Soon Buy TSE
Stock Index Units, BC CYCLE, Oct. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
258. See HARRIS, supra note 155 (manuscript at 5).
259. Id.
260. See supra note 243.
261. See supra part III.
262. See supra part IV.
[Vol. 26:843
DECIMAL STOCK PRICING
decimals.263 Only one day after news of the SEC's actions was published,
the SEC had already begun to distance itself from a proposal to convert
to decimals.2 Nothing ever materialized from the SEC's meeting with
SIAC.
On the eve of its Market 2000 study, the SEC has an opportunity,
once again, to study the effects of converting to decimal stock pricing and
to make it a priority. In its release announcing the boundaries of the
Market 2000 study, however, the SEC did not identify the format of
stock prices as one of the objectives of the study. Rather, it only periph-
erally identified the issue of decimal stock pricing in a footnote as a po-
tential solution to the practice of payment for order flow.265 Decimal
stock pricing would benefit investors beyond its capacity as a remedy to
payment for order flow.266 Accordingly, the SEC should include a possi-
ble conversion to decimals in its Market 2000 study.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress created the SEC with the expectation that the SEC would
regulate the stock markets. If the stock markets fail to protect investor
interests or erect barriers to competition, the SEC must intervene and
correct those market failures.
Nearly two hundred years after the creation of organized stock trad-
ing in the United States, exchange specialists and OTC market makers
continue to price stocks in fractions. Although the format of colonial
currency necessitated fractional stock pricing, the practice is impractical
in modem markets. Nevertheless, those who profit on investor trading in
U.S. stock markets have maintained this outdated practice because it ar-
tificially inflates the spreads from which they generate their profits.
Converting to decimals would benefit the investing public.
Decimals would generate price competition and narrow spreads. More-
over, decimals would obviate the practice of payment for order flow,
which undermines an investor's ability to receive favorable pricing. Fur-
ther, a conversion to decimals would not necessarily harm the stock mar-
kets. Profits lost to narrower spreads would be largely recouped through
increased domestic and international order flow.
263. Torres & Salwen, supra note 12, at Cl.
264. See Wloszczyna, supra note 13, at B3 ("Securities and Exchange Commission Chair-
man Richard Breeden said ... he hasn't directed his staff to investigate a conversion. An
agency spokeswoman said she couldn't comment because SEC staff members haven't made a
proposal yet."); Zonana, supra note 157, at D2 (" '[Decimal stock pricing] is a very low prior-
ity for us.' "(quoting SEC spokeswoman)).
265. See Market 2000 Release, supra note 2, at 1537 n.58.
266. See supra parts IV.A.1, IV.B., V.
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Therefore, to the extent that the SEC continues to ignore the issue of
decimal stock pricing, it fails in its capacity as a regulatory watchdog of
the securities markets. Complicated by wide-ranging repercussions, the
issue of decimal stock pricing demands rigorous study. The SEC's cur-
rent Market 2000 study is the perfect vehicle.
Michael A. Hart *
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[Vol. 26:843
